Recent results in kinematics, obtained by myself and those working with me, have convinced me that the philosophical status of physics, as it has come down to us from Renaissance days, requires reconsideration. The reason can be stated in a couple of sentences: it has been found possible to establish certain laws of physics—laws of motion, the law of gravitation, the laws known under the name of the Lorentz transformation, and some others—purely deductively, without specific assumptions, and (...) without empirical appeals save only to the empirical awareness of something we call “the passage of time.” Yet physicists have claimed ad nauseam that the ultimate sanction for “laws of nature” is observation and experiment, that this is what distinguishes physics from other branches of exact inquiry. The contrast in these two conceptions of natural law needs no emphasis. It is the purpose of this article to attempt to clarify this confused situation. (shrink)

The book is divided into three sections: Law and Ethics, Natural Law, and Judicial Reasoning. The list of contributors is distinguished, but the articles are scarcely that. J. C. Murray's criticism of J. Rawls' attempt to locate justice in a legal order by means of the concept of "fair play," S. G. Brown's criticism of K. Neilsen's nearly ranting attack on Natural Law, and K. Stern's brilliantly suggestive attack on the normative/descriptive dichotomy were all bright spots; but they are not (...) enough to rescue the book from mediocrity.—E. A. R. (shrink)

The book is divided into two parts, the shorter of which documents and discusses the authoritative and Biblical sources for the Christian, and specifically Catholic, notion of natural law. The second section is taken up with conceptual analyses of such notions as the relation between nature and grace, nature and historical situation, and primary and secondary determinations of the natural law. A final chapter considers the possibility and scope of a Christian Sociology. The, in principle, complete integration of nature and (...) grace is maintained throughout in opposition to what Fuchs types as the postulated antinomy between these two orders that characterizes most Protestant theologies. The major confrontation between the Catholic and Protestant positions takes place in the footnotes, which are consequently of extensive bibliographical value.—E. A. R. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that the principles of logics based on the Law of Contradiction are not universal in the sense that their use can appear to be irrelevant if premises are contradictory.

This is the second volume in Professor Stone's impressive, jurisprudential trilogy. The three volumes present a progression from a consideration of jurisprudential practice, through a consideration of the theories that have been raised to justify or affect the direction of practice, to an attempt to define the proper range of application for a legal theory —a range which Stone thinks can be specified only by a close interweaving of the resources available from both a legal tradition and, most importantly, the (...) social sciences. After an opening chapter in which he cites the confluence of both the Greek and Hebraic notions of law and justice as the two heterogenous traditions underpinning Western jurisprudential theory, Stone moves on to a systematic exposition and critical review of the major theories of justice: classical natural law, Kantian individualism, hedonistic and social utilitarianism, neo-Hegelian and neo-Kantian social idealism, revived natural law, legal positivism, and pragmatism. The expositions are obviously erudite and exhaustive within their recognized limits. Stone's assessment of each tradition is not always as penetrating and original as one may have liked, but this is in no way to impugn the expository and superb bibliographical merits of this volume.—E. A. R. (shrink)

In this paper I attempt to bring together (at least) two very different debates: one on justice, mercy and particularity, the other on the play of exclusionary reasons. My aim is to show how the discussion of the uneasy co-existence of justice and mercy pivots on the question of particularity. And, secondly, that the debate on exclusionary reasons can show us why law may fail to do justice in this context.

Elsasser outlines in an informal but meticulous fashion an organismic biology which promises, in his opinion, to combine the best features of epigenetic vitalism and preformationist mechanism. Mechanistic reductionism is for Elsasser an unverifiable metaphysical hypothesis; i.e., if the postulate of infinite homogenous classes is dropped from the axiomatics of Van Neumann's proof that the state of any system is, in principle, Quantum Mechanically determinable, it becomes combinatorically obvious that biological systems and classes are radically inhomogenous [[sic]], a fact which (...) operationally bars the way to any complete reductionism. The door is thus opened to an open-ended theoretical biology in which all questions do not have a truth-functional equivalent answer according to the axioms and laws of the science, and prediction in the science becomes statistical in a nonabsolute way. Elsasser is a physicist with more than a casual acquaintance with biology and his argument benefits by his obvious expertise in both of these areas. Philosophically, however, he is a lightweight and relies, in particular, too much on the ontological ice that might be cut by operationalism. Theories are not verified in the stringent operational sense; they are confirmed in a way which is not logically tied to the requirement that all laws be inductively established. Elsasser, however, has so much to say on the problem of reductionism in biology that is of obvious value that the book is easily recommended over these caveats.—E. A. R. (shrink)

The Dual State, first published in 1941, remains one of the most erudite books on the legal origins of democracy and dictatorship. It provided the first comprehensive analysis of the rise and nature of National Socialism, and was the only such analysis written from within Hitler's Germany. Fraenkel's concept of the dual state, being the normative state and the the prerogative state. It retains its vital relevance for the theory of democracy in the twenty-first century. The Dual State considerably influenced (...) scholars studying and working on questions of political justice in the period following World War II, particularly in the context of political and legal theory; in the domain of legal history; in the area of constitutional theory; in the context of comparative politics; and in what has become known as the field of comparative constitutional law. This republication of Fraenkel's classic work makes it once again widely available to scholars and students in the field. It includes both Fraenkel's 1974 introduction to the German second edition, never before published in English, and a new introduction by Dr Jens Meierhenrich, examining the world in which The Dual State was originally published, and the lasting legacy of this classic work. (shrink)

This book was edited from a set of tapes taken at a course in natural law which the late professor Simon gave at the University of Chicago in 1958. The subject is one Simon had long reflected upon and frequently dealt with in other works; and there is nothing of a substantive nature that is new with this volume. The combination of Simon's noted pedagogical talent and a skillful job of editing conspire, however, to provide a succinct and helpful review (...) of the past, present, and future place of natural law in ethical jurisprudence. The stress, if any, is that natural law was never meant to be a "pure theory" of law following a rigid deductive model, and is, in fact, the philosophical perspective most congenial to the combination of theoretical and practical reasoning that is necessary for a pertinent jurisprudence.—E. A. R. (shrink)

To discuss Professor Lindsay's doctrine of ‘Breves Breviantes’ would involve writing a long article, for which there is no space in the April number of the Class. Quart. But it would be wrong in me to pass his treatment of Plaut. Bacch. 1106 by without comment. What he calls ‘a sane view of the law of B.B.’ involves the emendation of a number of lines which are in other respects quite above suspicion. In these circumstances would it not be the (...) wiser course to reconsider the supposed ‘sane law’ rather than to attempt to alter the text so as to make it fit a law which is not admitted by some of the most eminent of modern critics ? Emendation is particularly unfortunate in this instance, because the metre is anapaestic, and the suggestion of Professor Lindsay that the word Philoxene may be ‘a gloss to indicate the speaker or a misinterpretation of some marginal indication of a speaker’ is surely ill-considered; for the speaker is Nicobulus, and the speakers of adjacent lines are given correctly, so far as I see, in the MSS. Such a gloss would, then, be meaningless. Professor Lindsay's attempt at emendation of this line is, in fact, striking evidence of the bankruptcy of the ‘sane view‘ of iambic shortening to which he has unfortunately committed himself. (shrink)

In this 1965 Lindley Lecture Hampshire centers his argument around the nature of belief; but the argument could be easily generalized to cover any mental act or activity where reasons rather than causes are invoked to classify and partially explain the act or activity in question. The causes which Hampshire distinguishes from reasons are the sort that would fit into explanations of the covering-law variety. Hampshire argues that causes in the above mentioned sense undoubtedly form the basis for intentional activity; (...) but were an agent to be shown that such causes were the sufficient conditions for a particular piece of his behavior, he would change the classification of this particular bit of behavior from intentional to non-intentional. The effect would not, however, be a reductive explanation of intentional behavior, but merely a limitation of its scope. The point is seen most clearly in the case of belief: if it appeared that there were sufficient causal conditions for a given belief, the holder of this belief would reassess his position and transform his belief into an inclination to belief. The causal conditions would become part of the evidential basis for re-making or rejecting the belief. The point is that belief itself requires a commitment beyond the given; and the ontological requirement of such a commitment is what Hampshire, following Spinoza, calls "freedom of mind."--E. A. R. (shrink)

The five chapters in this volume were originally delivered in lecture form at the University of Genoa and have previously appeared in French, German, and English translations. An appendix, "What the Philosopher May Learn from the Study of Law," has also appeared before in English. The book is basically a digest, with some modifications, of Perelman's earlier work Justice et Raison. The chief modification involves a supposed shift away from positivism toward a greater emphasis on the cognitive status of primary (...) values. Through the mediation of his consideration of the nature of practical reason in the Traité de l'Argumentation, Perelman now wishes to argue that values are subject to dialectical justification. The analysis of justice, thus, need not be restricted to merely formal specifications such as the rule of justice or to such inherently nonuniversalizable and nonanalyzable principles as that of equity. Dialectical justification falls short of demonstration, but only someone still under the spell of Cartesianism would wish to maintain that rationality is adequately summarized in the model provided by mathematics and science. Jurisprudence, therefore deals with judgments that have cognitive and not arbitrary or merely historical value. So much for the scheme of Perelman's argument. What about its execution? It must be said that its substance is slight and the base of discussion extraordinarily narrow. Thus, Perelman says he wishes to avoid the Scylla of nominalism and the Charybdis of realism; but his own analysis winds up squarely in a conventionalism that is only minutely distinguishable from the nominalism he presumably attacks: e.g., "the idea of [practical] reason must not be linked to that of truth", "reason is but an attempt to convince the members of [the universal] audience--whom common sense would define as well-informed and reasonable men". The only defense offered by Perelman for the first statement is a flaunting of the bogey of dogmatism. The vicious circle in the second statement is barred from rising to the level of the fruitful Aristotelian paradox by a peremptory dismissal of natural law: "The theorists of natural law... have not convinced the majority of those philosophers of law who are endowed with critical minds." This kind of "you-don't-belong-to-the-club" argument makes the book practically worthless from a truly dialectical point of view. The only critical sparks generated are in Perelman's discussion of Rawls' theory of "justice as fair play." His points here are well taken. But, as this is the only saving grace in the book--the rest being merely a statement of Perelman's own doxa about justice--it would have been better to leave the whole interred in the journals where it had already been published.--E. A. R. (shrink)

A topical rather than systematic consideration of some key methodological rather than substantive notions in the philosophy of science. The form and strategy of scientific inquiry and explanation, confirmation of hypotheses, laws, and theories are the mainstays of Hempel's discussion. The treatment is lucid in the way an introduction should be. The chapter on concept formation contains a discussion of operational definitions which is especially well done. Perhaps the only drawback is that the student reading this introductory text will (...) not get as much of an impression as would be desirable that there are issues as well as topics in the philosophy of science.—E. A. R. (shrink)

In terms of the details of Plato's life, the composition and order of the Dialogues and Epistles, and the political and scholastic climate of Plato's Athens and the broader Hellenic culture, this is a daringly imaginative book; critics may find it too imaginative. Ryle argues against the authenticity of all the Epistles, basing his conclusion on a bit of close detective work involving the date of Dionysius I's death and the date of Plato's invitation to Syracuse: Epistle VII is all (...) a bit of baseless Dionist propaganda. Ryle's conjecture that the majority of the Dialogues were designed for public dramatization and open competition, on the model of the Greek tragedies, at local and Olympic games is a distinct possibility. But will we be convinced by the many "straws" that support the hypothesis that the Apology-Crito-Phaedo sequence of Dialogues was written by Plato, not to justify Socrates, but to defend himself against a contemporary charge of defamation? that the Academy was founded in 371, not 387? that the Phaedrus was composed in 361-360, after the Laws? that the Republic was never published in Plato's lifetime? While Ryle vigorously supports all these contentions, inconsistencies or more plausible hypothesis remain. The book is unfortunately completely silent about any of the substantive issues in Plato's philosophy; but perhaps enough has been gained if Plato scholars are sent scurrying back to the ancillary Greek philosophies and histories, not to mention the stylometrists.—E. A. R. (shrink)

Thomas Chubb seems to have been an 18th century English artisan class version of Eric Hoffer. Only the subject for Chubb was Deism rather than democracy. This is not, of course, to deny the link between these two, a link which is accented to some extent in Chubb's own work. Bushell has given us a short biographical account of Chubb together with six chapters that dutifully comb Chubb's moral, political, and, especially, his theological writings for a synthetic view of Chubb's (...) opinion on such subjects as the historical Jesus, theodicy, providence, toleration, and natural law. Chubb seems to have attracted the curiosity of the intelligensia [[sic]] of his own and later times. But, on balance, he does not appear to be even a major minor figure.--E. A. R. (shrink)

These Terry Lectures for 1962 develop Polanyi's notion of tacit knowing through three stages: its epistemological analysis and justification, its ontological generalization to a doctrine of emergence, and its social dimension and implications. and may be briefly characterized as follows: Tacit knowledge refers to the set of particulars implicitly grasped in the explicit grasping of a comprehensive entity, the latter being the meaning of the former. Mutually supporting doctrines of epistemological isomorphism and critical realism underlie the argument, but the crucial, (...) unjustified assumption is that tacit "knowing" is a knowing. Why not assimilate it to patterned-governed behavior explicable on an S-R model? Ontologically, the tacit component shows up as the set of particulars with their attendant structural laws which underlie but do not exhaustively define the comprehensive entities of which, due to the mechanism of emergence, they are components. Non-reducibility is evidenced by the dynamic or operational laws which govern the emergent entities, but which do not show up in the lower level account. The qualitative irreducibility of sentience is mentioned but not developed as an argument. In justifying his notion of a mechanism of emergence, Polanyi at first makes some rather obscure references to vitalism, an organismic principle, and élan vital, but then comes out with a more properly metaphysical analysis in terms of the eliciting function of a principle of potentiality. There is a definite Whiteheadian ring to the analysis, but Whitehead is nowhere mentioned. Polanyi's work deserves serious attention, and this compact presentation of some of the essentials of his thought will serve to send more readers on to, or back to, Personal Knowledge.—E. A. R. (shrink)

Thomas Chubb seems to have been an 18th century English artisan class version of Eric Hoffer. Only the subject for Chubb was Deism rather than democracy. This is not, of course, to deny the link between these two, a link which is accented to some extent in Chubb's own work. Bushell has given us a short biographical account of Chubb together with six chapters that dutifully comb Chubb's moral, political, and, especially, his theological writings for a synthetic view of Chubb's (...) opinion on such subjects as the historical Jesus, theodicy, providence, toleration, and natural law. Chubb seems to have attracted the curiosity of the intelligensia [[sic]] of his own and later times. But, on balance, he does not appear to be even a major minor figure.--E. A. R. (shrink)

The five chapters in this volume were originally delivered in lecture form at the University of Genoa and have previously appeared in French, German, and English translations. An appendix, "What the Philosopher May Learn from the Study of Law," has also appeared before in English. The book is basically a digest, with some modifications, of Perelman's earlier work Justice et Raison. The chief modification involves a supposed shift away from positivism toward a greater emphasis on the cognitive status of primary (...) values. Through the mediation of his consideration of the nature of practical reason in the Traité de l'Argumentation, Perelman now wishes to argue that values are subject to dialectical justification. The analysis of justice, thus, need not be restricted to merely formal specifications such as the rule of justice or to such inherently nonuniversalizable and nonanalyzable principles as that of equity. Dialectical justification falls short of demonstration, but only someone still under the spell of Cartesianism would wish to maintain that rationality is adequately summarized in the model provided by mathematics and science. Jurisprudence, therefore deals with judgments that have cognitive and not arbitrary or merely historical value. So much for the scheme of Perelman's argument. What about its execution? It must be said that its substance is slight and the base of discussion extraordinarily narrow. Thus, Perelman says he wishes to avoid the Scylla of nominalism and the Charybdis of realism; but his own analysis winds up squarely in a conventionalism that is only minutely distinguishable from the nominalism he presumably attacks: e.g., "the idea of [practical] reason must not be linked to that of truth", "reason is but an attempt to convince the members of [the universal] audience--whom common sense would define as well-informed and reasonable men". The only defense offered by Perelman for the first statement is a flaunting of the bogey of dogmatism. The vicious circle in the second statement is barred from rising to the level of the fruitful Aristotelian paradox by a peremptory dismissal of natural law: "The theorists of natural law... have not convinced the majority of those philosophers of law who are endowed with critical minds." This kind of "you-don't-belong-to-the-club" argument makes the book practically worthless from a truly dialectical point of view. The only critical sparks generated are in Perelman's discussion of Rawls' theory of "justice as fair play." His points here are well taken. But, as this is the only saving grace in the book--the rest being merely a statement of Perelman's own doxa about justice--it would have been better to leave the whole interred in the journals where it had already been published.--E. A. R. (shrink)

Many people who have reached the age of majority still qualify as financial dependents of their parents, and may be registered as dependents on their parents’ medical schemes. This poses a practical conundrum, because major persons enjoy complete autonomy over their bodies to choose healthcare services as they please, including informational determination. However, their sensitive health information may end up being disclosed in the accounts rendered to their parents, as main members of medical schemes, thereby breaching their informational privacy, medical (...) confidentiality and possibly also damaging personal relationships. On the other hand, medical schemes must ensure that they strictly manage the business of their hospitalisation to ensure that they can adhere to their contractual and legal medical insurance obligations. Both major but financially dependent patients and medical schemes have good legal grounds to defend their respective positions. In this article, we will analyse and clarify the applicable legal and ethical grounds by considering medical confidentiality, the Protection of Personal Information Act, the Consumer Protection Act and the Medical Schemes Act and rules. We shall conclude with recommendations to accommodate the interests of both parties. (shrink)

In 1932, John von Neumann argued for the equivalence of the thermodynamic entropy and −Trρlnρ, since known as the von Neumann entropy. Meir Hemmo and Orly R. Shenker recently challenged this argument by pointing out an alleged discrepancy between the two entropies in the single-particle case, concluding that they must be distinct. In this article, their argument is shown to be problematic as it allows for a violation of the second law of thermodynamics and is based on an incorrect calculation (...) of the von Neumann entropy. (shrink)

This article examines one of the relevant concepts in the current debate on home birth—autonomy in place of birth—and its uses in general language, ethics, and childbirth health care literature. International discussion on childbirth services. A concept analysis guided by the model of Walker and Avant. The authors suggest that autonomy in the context of choosing place of birth is defined by three main attributes: information, capacity and freedom; given the antecedent of not harming others, and the consequences of accountability (...) for the outcome. Model, borderline and contrary cases of autonomy in place of birth are presented. A woman choosing place of birth is autonomous if she receives all relevant information on available choices, risks and benefits, is capable of understanding and processing the information and choosing place of birth in the absence of coercion, provided she intends no harm to others and is accountable for the outcome. The attributes of the definition can serve as a useful tool for pregnant women, midwives, and other health professionals in contemplating their moral status and discussing place of birth. (shrink)

In light of the development of “CRISPR” technology, new promising advances in therapeutic and preventive approaches have become a reality. However, with it came many ethical challenges. The most recent worldwide condemnation of the first use of CRISPR to genetically modify a human embryo is the latest example of ethically questionable use of this new and emerging field. Monotheistic religions are very conservative about such changes to the human genome and can be considered an interference with God’s creation. Moreover, these (...) changes could cause perpetual changes to future generations. The Muslim scholars establish their decisions by addressing five foundations of Islamic law i.e. “maqāṣid al sharı̄`a”; the purposes of the law. These are dın̄, nafs, nasl, `aql and māl. To achieve this, the five principles should all be met before approval of an experiment like the Chinese embryo modifications; Qaṣd which is achieved in this case as it aims to protect the embryo from HIV. Yaqın̄ and Ḍarar were not satisfied as they require strong scientific certainty of the procedures, and evidence of safety. Ḍarūra by which the alternatives being compared; in this case more established and proven safe alternatives to protect the HIV transmission from the father are available, so this principle is not met. The final principle is `Urf, by which the social context of using any contemporary technology should be taken in consideration, and clearly this was not achieved. Collectively, germline changes are rejected from an Islamic perspective until the five principles are fulfilled. In the Chinese Twins gene editing case, there was clearly no justification or support for it according to the Muslim Jurisprudence laws. These laws and approaches can serve as an ethical checklist for such controversial research, especially in early stages of the research. (shrink)

The paper analysis the strategies and concepts developed in the world in modern directions: innova- tive economy, digital economy, artificial intelligence, Industry 4.0 and others. The problem is to determine the initial fundamental parameters of order and their prospects in the global world, the definition and principles of artificial intel- ligence systems, its structure and important aspects and principles of future science and technology in analysis and synthesis based on synergetic approaches, innovative, information, converged technologies, taking into account the design (...) of future and viable and safe and sustainable development in the context of Industry 4.0, digital economy and Society 5.0. The general scheme of the integrated model of sustainable and socio-humanitarian development in the global system is proposed, which the authors call the noosphere model of sustainable and safe development as an important fundamental platform for the design and creation of AIS. In the XXI century education, science and innova- tive technologies becomes the «basis» of the spiritual and material reproduction of man, transforming the society of the XXI century into an educational society, ensures compliance with the law of advanced development of human quality, quality of social intelligence and quality of educational systems in society. noosphere evolution. Industry 4.0 is the next stage in the digitalization of production technologies with the accelerated introduction of new developments and cyberphysical systems, which is changing business models. Accordingly, Industry 4.0 as a separate segment of digital manufacturing technologies takes its place among other digital sectors. The analysis of the Strategies and Concepts developed in the world in modern directions: innovative economy, digital economy, artificial intelli- gence, Industry 4.0 and others is carried out in the work. The problem is to determine the initial fundamental para- meters of order and their prospects in the global world, the definition and principles of artificial intelligence systems, its structure and important aspects and principles of future science and technology in analysis and synthesis ba- sed on synergetic approaches, innovative, information, converged technologies, taking into account the design of future and viable and safe and sustainable development in the context of Industry 4.0, DE and Society 5.0. The main scientific and technological factors in the 21st century will be the development of: Artificial Intelligence, Nano Technologies, Bio-Media Technologies, Cognitive Technologies and Socio-Humanitarian Technologies. More specifically – this is the modern development of Innovative Technologies: «NBIC SH». Therefore, it is necessary to note the importance of taking into account the principle of I2K2+SH, ie: Intellectualization, Integration, Convergence, Coevolution and Socio- humanitarian technologies. It is important and necessary to take into account modern principles of designing a su- stainable and secure AIS and solving the problem of Harmonization between 2 worlds: Real and Virtual, especially in their hybridization. Our immediate future is a hybrid nonlinear world. Note that digitalization, artificial intelligence and robotics will be the main drivers of global economic growth by 2030E. An important paradigm and platform is the Integrated System: for Industry 4.0, DE and AI, taking into account the complex principle of I2K2+SH. If the transition of the Ukrainian economy to an innovative one does not take place in the next 3-5 years, Ukraine will remain in the backyard of civilization. (shrink)

This article focuses on the legal and organisational regulation of human cells in the United Kingdom and France. French Bioethics Law regulates human cells for health according to European Union law where it is enforceable. But products unregulated by EU law and based on human cells are never considered as medicinal products, given the strict implementation of the principle of “nonpatrimonialité” of the human body and its elements. By comparison, in the UK such products can be qualified as medicinal products. (...) Moreover, the setting up of the UK stem cell bank gives rise to the development of policies which expand the stem cell as a legal object. The paper discusses how these societies’ ethical and legal commitments underlie organisational practices in order to analyse the relationship between the existence (or not) of a national stem cell bank and the broader regulation of human cells. (shrink)

Law and History contains a collection of essays by prominent legal historians, which explore the ways in which history has been used by lawyers past and present to answer legal questions. In common with earlier volumes in the Current Legal Issues series, it seeks both a theoretical and methodological focus. This volume covers a broad range of topics, from a discussion of the nature of norms in the middle ages to the role of war crimes trials in the twentieth century. (...) It includes wide-ranging historiographical discussions, which examine the nature and aims of the legal historian, as well as contributions which explore the methodology and aims of writers such as Coke, Maine, Weber, Montesquieu, and Kames, who sought to use historical models to explain law. A number of contributions examine developments in legal doctrine, particularly in the nineteenth century, including developments in the law of contract, administrative law, and perjury. These raise important questions about the nature of the legal categorizations which developed in that era. Law and History also includes a collection of contributons on the use of history in twentieth century trials, including the Nuremberg trials, the trial of the Gang of Four, and trials arising from the events in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. (shrink)

The moral doctrine of Hobbes, in many ways the most interesting of our major British philosophers, is, I think, commonly seen in a false perspective which has seriously obscured its real affinities. This is, no doubt, largely due to the fact that most modern readers begin and end their study of Hobbes's ethics with the Leviathan , a rhetorical and, in many ways, a popular Streitschrift published in the very culmination of what looked at the time to be a permanent (...) revolution, and do not pay such attention to the more calmly argued statements of the same doctrine contained in the Elements of Law , circulated before the outbreak of the Civil War, or the De Cive. (shrink)

This volume brings together a number of important studies by leading scholars on ritual and law, philosophy and religion, literature and entertainments in Qin and Han China. A few contributions deal with the Han legacy to later Chinese culture.

In 2017, Italy passed a law that provides for a systematic discipline on informed consent, advance directives, and advance care planning. It ranges from decisions contextual to clinical necessity through the tool of consent/refusal to decisions anticipating future events through the tools of shared care planning and advance directives. Nothing is said in the law regarding the issue of physician assisted suicide. Following the DJ Fabo case, the Italian Constitutional Court declared the constitutional illegitimacy of article 580 of the criminal (...) code in the part in which it does not exclude the punishment of those who facilitate the suicide when the decision has been freely and autonomously made by a person kept alive by life-support treatments and suffering from an irreversible pathology, the source of physical or psychological suffering that he/she considers intolerable, but fully capable of making free and conscious decisions. Such conditions and methods of execution must be verified by a public structure of the national health service, after consulting the territorially competent ethics committee. This statement admits, within strict and regulated bounds, physician assisted suicide, so widening the range of end-of-life decisions for Italian patients. Future application and critical topics will be called into question by the Italian legislator. (shrink)

The study of law and politics is one of the foundation stones of the discipline of political science, and it has been one of the productive areas of cross-fertilization between the various subfields of political science and between political science and other cognate disciplines. This Handbook provides a comprehensive survey of the field of law and politics in all its diversity, ranging from such traditional subjects as theories of jurisprudence, constitutionalism, judicial politics and law-and-society to such re-emerging subjects as comparative (...) judicial politics, international law, and democratization. The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics gathers together leading scholars in the field to assess key literatures shaping the discipline today and to help set the direction of research in the decade ahead. (shrink)

The study of law and politics is one of the foundation stones of the discipline of political science, and it has been one of the productive areas of cross-fertilization between the various subfields of political science and between political science and other cognate disciplines. This Handbook provides a comprehensive survey of the field of law and politics in all its diversity, ranging from such traditional subjects as theories of jurisprudence, constitutionalism, judicial politics and law-and-society to such re-emerging subjects as comparative (...) judicial politics, international law, and democratization. The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics gathers together leading scholars in the field to assess key literatures shaping the discipline today and to help set the direction of research in the decade ahead. (shrink)